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The Double-Occupation of Palestine 
Abstract:  This article argues that the recent calm the West Bank is currently experiencing is as a result of the 
US-Israeli strategy of outsourcing the disciplinary power of the occupation to the Palestinian Authority (PA).  
It discusses recent security commitments that the US has made to the PA, and popular Palestinian perception 
of PA soldiers.  In addition, considered here is the way in which the governing US/Israel/PA governing 
strategy is manifesting itself in new spatial formations in the West Bank, from new roads and shopping 
festivals to new prisons and Palestinian-maintained checkpoints.   Finally, raised here is the question as to 
whether a new resistant politics could possibly emerge from the present status quo, whether yet another 
generation of Palestinians can be expected to struggle and sacrifice, or whether the post-political malaise 
currently pervasive in Palestine (and elsewhere) will be perpetuated with the creation of a new generation of 
apolitical young consumers in the West Bank.  
Keywords:  Palestine, Israeli Occupation, Neocolonialism, Sovereignty, Prisons 
When discussing Israeli military-political strategy in the occupied Palestinian territories, it has become 
a commonplace caveat in more critical circles to point out that such a strategy should more properly be called 
a US/Israeli military-political strategy. Consistent with over 40 years of bi-partisan support for Israel and its 
occupation, the Obama administration has committed itself to a $30 billion, decade-long military aid 
commitment to Israel.1  With the requirement that 75% of this aid be spent on US military contracts, such 
spending not only subsidizes American weapons manufactures, but also serves to secure American military 
might in the vitally strategic Middle East through a reliable and relatively stable Israeli proxy, serving as a 
deterrent to the Syrian and Iranian threat’s on Iraq’s borders.2  Of course, military aid is not the only support 
that the US provides.  Under the US’s impartial diplomatic arbitration, peace talks between Israel and self-
appointed Palestinian leaders began in September.  Having stalled over Israel’s refusal to extend its settlement 
freeze, the US has presented a new carrot to Israel in the form of a $3 billion military aid contract for the 
purchase of 20 state-of-the-art F-35 joint strike fighters.  In return, the US has asked for another settlement 
freeze, lasting just 90 days and not including to East Jerusalem.  Meanwhile dozens of Palestinian homes in 
East Jerusalem are facing demolition, the Israeli imposed siege continues to strangle the residents of Gaza, 
who continue to endure almost daily bombardment and attack.  All this is done as the dust still settles in the 
                                                          
1 As a headliŶe ďǇ the Isƌaeli dailǇ Haaƌetz pƌoĐlaiŵs ͞Oďaŵa ǁoŶ't Đut ŵilitaƌǇ aid to Isƌael […] $30b promised 
over next decade ǁill Ŷot ďe haƌŵed ďǇ ǁoƌld fiŶaŶĐial Đƌisis.͟  http://www.haaretz.com/news/u-s-official-obama-
won-t-cut-military-aid-to-israel-1.271902 
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Jordan valley following the destruction of an entire Palestinian village3, along with countless homes and other 
structures throughout the West Bank4, not to mention Bedouin villages in inside historic Palestine (Israel 
proper).5  
While such military, economic and diplomatic support to Israel is well known, less often discussed is 
the US’s support for the Palestinian Authority, and the vital role such support plays in serving US/Israeli 
strategic security interests.  In addition to the aforementioned $30 billion dollar aid deal with Israel, the US 
will also provide “$500 million in aid to the Palestinian Authority, including $100 million for the training of 
Palestinian security forces by American general Keith Dayton”.6  This aid pledge comes on top of the $392 
million that the US has already given to the West Bank government since 2007, following the US-backed 
Fateh takeover, ousting the democratically elected Hamas government and relegating it to its Gazan ghetto.7  
This assistance is intended to bring about the colonial strategy of indigenous self-policing that was envisioned 
in the Oslo Accords.  When Netanyahu speaks in favor of allowing a “demilitarized” Palestinian state to 
coexist alongside Israel, he does not mean to imply that there will not be Palestinians with guns, he simply 
means that these guns will be pointed at the Palestinians themselves, away from Israel.  Such a strategy allows 
Israel to continue undermining Palestinian territorial integrity and economic independence, while at the same 
time allowing a minimal degree of disciplinary power that the Palestinians can wield against themselves, at a 
far reduced cost to Israel.  Rather than a “two state solution”, this might more accurately be called a “two 
flag” solution, as real state sovereignty continues to rest only in the hands of the Israeli government, with 
certain disciplinary duties outsourced to the Palestinian Authority.   
The Shifting Tide of Sovereignty in the Occupied Territories 
When I teach my students about the shifting nature of sovereignty in the occupied territories, and the 
evolving strategies of governance undertaken by the occupying power, I show them a set of pictures depicting 
the same government building taken at different moments in the occupation. 8  The building shown is the 
muaqta’, located on the outskirts of Nablus in the northern West Bank.  The first picture shows the muqata’ as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2
 Benhorin, Yitzhak.  ͞Oďaŵa Appƌoǀes Aid to Isƌael, PA͟.  Ynet News, 18 December 2009.  
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/1,7340,L-3821976,00.html 
3
 Hass, Amira.  IDF Destroys West Bank village afteƌ deĐlaƌiŶg it a Đlosed ŵilitaƌǇ zoŶe͟. Haaƌetz, Ϯϭ JuŶe ϮϬϭϬ.  
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/idf-destroys-west-bank-village-after-declaring-it-military-zone-
1.303098 
4
 AŵŶestǇ IŶteƌŶatioŶal, ͞Isƌael IŶteŶsifies West BaŶk Hoŵe DeŵolitioŶs.͟  Ϯϭ JulǇ ϮϬϭϬ.   
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/israel-intensifies-west-bank-palestinian-home-demolitions-2010-
07-21 
5
 EleĐtƌoŶiĐ IŶtifada Repoƌt, ͞Isƌael destƌoǇs BedouiŶ ǀillage, agaiŶ.͟  Electronic Intifada, 5 August 2010.    
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article11445.shtml 
6
 Yitzhak. ͞Oďaŵa Appƌoǀes Aid to Isƌael, PA͟. 
7
 Rose, Daǀid.  ͞The Gaza Boŵďshell͟.  Vanity Fair, April 2008. 
8
 “ee GoƌdoŶ ;ϮϬϬϴͿ foƌ aŶ eǆĐelleŶt disĐussioŶ of Isƌael’s goǀeƌŶŵeŶtal stƌategies iŶ the oĐĐupied teƌƌitoƌies.   
Marshall 3 
 
 
it looked when it was built by the British during the mandate period, and later when it was controlled by the 
Jordanians following the war of 1948, and then used as an Israeli command-post after the 1967 invasion.  The 
imposing structure was originally built in 1937 along with 70 other military-police forts built by the British 
following the first Palestinian intifada of 1936.  The forts were commissioned by Sir Charles Tegart, a highly 
decorated colonial official and engineer who earned a reputation for his ruthless suppression of Bengali 
nationalism during his tenure as General Inspector of Intelligence and later Commissioner of Police in 
Calcutta.9 
 
Figure 1: The muqata’a pre-1967, beneath Mount Gerizim upon which an Israeli military outpost is now perched, courtesy of Palestine Remembered. 
Tegart’s forts still stand today in Israel and the occupied territories, serving as museums, government 
buildings, police stations and jails.  Fort Meretz in northern Israel functions as a detention facility for high-
level security prisoners, including Lebanese fighters disappeared during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon.  
Having been erased from official maps, Meretz is now known as Camp 1391, although it is sometimes called 
“Israel’s Guantanamo” in reference to the sexual abuse and torture that takes place within its walls.10  
Presciently, in 1938, a year after his forts were commissioned, Tegart wielded another weapon in his 
architectural arsenal against the Arab Revolt: a separation barrier.  As a Time Magazine blurb from 20 June, 
1938 reports:  “Following a suggestion of mail-fisted Sir Charles Tegart, now adviser to the Palestine 
Government on the suppression of terrorism, a barbed wire barrier to keep out terrorists is being strung 
along the entire Palestine frontier at a cost of $450,000.”11  Of course, Tegart’s would not be the last attempt 
                                                          
9
 La Guaƌdia, AŶtoŶ. ͞JeƌiĐho Jail Cƌeates OǁŶ ModeƌŶ HistoƌǇ͟.  LA Times, 24 March 2006. 
10
 MĐGƌeal, Chƌis.  ͞FaĐilitǇ ϭϯϵϭ: Isƌael’s seĐƌet pƌisoŶ͟, The Guardian, 14 November 2003. 
11
 ͞PalestiŶe: Tegaƌt’s Wall͟, Time Magazine, 20 June 1938.  The fence was to be built along the northern border 
with the Lebanon and Syrian mandates, where, as Time ƌepoƌts, ͞a lot of PalestiŶe’s tougheƌ Aƌaďs Đoŵe fƌoŵ͟.  
However, according to the report, almost as soon as Sir Charles announced the plans for the feŶĐe’s ĐoŵpletioŶ ͞a 
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to enforce colonially imposed boundaries using barriers and barbed-wire, nor would the torture he oversaw in 
his police forts end with the departure of the British in 1947.       
 
Figure 2: A half-destroyed muqata’ building following the invasions in Nablus of 2002 and 2003. 
The second picture in this scene of shifting sovereignty is a bullet-ridden, half destroyed version of 
the original structure.  Since 1994, following the Oslo Accords, the muqata’ had served as an administrative 
building, police station and municipal jail for the Palestinian Authority.  One of the first objectives of the 
intensive Israeli invasions of Operations Defensive Shield and Determined Path in 2002, was to seize 
Palestinian weapons, including any potential deterrent posed by the fledgling Palestinian security forces.  A 
large part of the Oslo “peace plan” was, ironically if not surprisingly, concerned with arming the Palestinian 
Authority, stipulating the exact strength of its police and security forces.  Attacking police stations (also the 
first targets of Israel’s attack on Gaza in 2008) was an initial step in rolling back the shift in sovereignty that 
Oslo had ushered in.  In so doing, Israel made clear that the authority given to the Palestinian Authority 
ultimately derived from the Israel, and that at any time the Israeli government could reinstate the direct 
sovereign violence of the occupation, knowing that Western peace money would be there to rebuild the 
rubble once the slate had been wiped clean.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
band of Arab terrorists swooped down on a section of the fence, dubbed Tegart's Wall, ripped it up and carted it 
aĐƌoss the fƌoŶtieƌ iŶto LeďaŶoŶ.͟    
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Figure 3: The muqata’ following its complete destruction in the summer of 2006.   
This return to direct sovereign violence is best illustrated by the final picture in this triptych of 
destruction: a completely gutted muqata’ building, torn apart by tanks and bulldozers in the summer of 2006 
(as Israel was simultaneously attacking Lebanon and Gaza).  Not content with allowing alleged terrorists to sit 
in a Palestinian jail, Israeli forces leveled the entire complex, killing three prisoners and a staff nurse, and 
blowing up a large civic archive maintained by the Department of Interior, scattering to the wind birth 
registries, land deeds and other historical documents dating back to the mandate period, as well as recent 
passport applications and birth certificates.  The destruction represents a complete suspension of the law, 
both the disciplinary legal authority that the Israelis had outsourced to the Palestinian during the Oslo years, 
and the biopolitical, bureaucratic governmental authority represented by the birth and death registries.12    
The Palestinian Neo-Liberal Security State 
There is another picture, however, which represents the governmental strategy currently being 
resurrected in the West Bank.  On road the from the Huwara checkpoint, the new Muqata’ stands as an 
unsightly welcome to the city of Nablus.  Today visitors are greeted with an entirely new incarnation of the 
building: a massive, medieval-looking walled structure that has the same hart-sinking effect on the viewer as 
does the West Bank barrier.  The new building is a bigger and better jail, a large solitary confinement cell, as it 
were, within the much larger carceral space of the occupied territories.  A large white billboard and EU flag 
informs passersby that the prison is being built with the generous support of the European Union.   
                                                          
12
 In March 2006, three months prior to the Nablus invasion, a similar operation was carried out by the Israelis in 
Jericho uŶdeƌ the Ŷaŵe ͞OpeƌatioŶ BƌiŶgiŶg Hoŵe the Goods.͟  The objective was to capture, amongst other 
prisoners, Ahmed Saadat, an activist with the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine who was involved in 
the 2001 assassination of the Israeli Tourism Minister.  Saadat had just been elected to the then Hamas-controlled 
Palestinian legislature, which had announced its intention to release Saadat, in violation of the agreement reached 
between US President George Bush, Israeli Prime Minister, and the late Yasser Arafat.   
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Flapping alongside the sign is the faded banner for the first Nablus Shopping Festival of 2009, a 
spectacle of consumption conspicuously coinciding with the opening of Huwara checkpoint by the Israelis, 
beaconing the Palestinian citizens of Israel to the great bargains to be found in the economically devastated 
West Bank, then open to travel for the first time in 9 years.  Tony Blair even came to Nablus to mark the 
occasion of the loosening of the West Bank siege – remarking that not so long ago Nablus was a no-go area 
for him, but thanks to the generosity of the Israelis, who had strangled the city for just about a decade, there 
was going to be peace and prosperity for the city.  The highlight of the shopping festival was the unveiling of 
the world’s largest kunafa, a sugary, cheesy desert of Nablus fame.  Salem Fayyad, the current unelected Prime 
Minister of Palestine, former World Bank executive, and never one to miss a photo-op, served up the desert 
to throngs of visitors who clambered over each other to get a piece, under the mistaken impression that, as 
rumor had it, keys to a new car were hidden somewhere in the sugary mess.13  As people gathered under the 
shadow of Nablus’ new mall (which had served as the scene of many street battles over the last few years 
until its recent opening), a smattering of spectators milling about Martyr’s Square could be heard murmuring 
“they’re eating the world’s biggest kunafa while in Gaza they don’t even have sugar for their tea – shame.”  
Another person agreed, “yeah, the Israelis have turned Palestine into the world’s biggest prison, and the 
Authority has made it into the world’s biggest joke.”   
The image of the bigger and better prison, flanked by signs of a shopping festival, and a notice of 
foreign funding, sums up perfectly the Palestinian state that the Western powers are eager to create, and that 
Salam Fayyad is dutifully to administering.  Unfortunately, the final picture in the series is not here, marked 
instead by its absence.   While trying to inconspicuously photograph the new prison from afar, I attracted the 
attention of the nearby Palestinian Authority security personnel who guard that particular area.  They 
approached me and demanded my camera, and summarily deleted the images.  The disciplinary power of the 
Palestinian Authority is made apparent with spectacular visibility, as the Authority reasserts itself on the 
landscape, building prisons where there once was rubble, and putting red-bereted soldiers in place of the 
masked fighters who stood on the same street corners only a few years ago.  This authority, however, is to be 
seen but not acknowledged.14  
                                                          
13
 Following the West Bank takeover, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas appointed Fayyad as Prime Minister 
uŶdeƌ ͞ŶatioŶal eŵeƌgeŶĐǇ͟ legislatioŶ, aŶ appoiŶtŵeŶt that ǁas ƌeŶeǁed iŶ MaǇ, ϮϬϬϵ. 
14 
The same is true for another conspicuously situated prison, al-Juneid, a former Israeli jail now located adjacent 
the new campus of an-Najah university – a torturously tantalizing location for many of the students who are 
detained there because of their questionable loyalties.  The classmates must pass the prison everyday on their way 
to their courses, a reminder not to speak, not to see, and not to question.  A colleague of mine was held there by 
both the Israelis and the Palestinians.  During his latest stay, his CIA-trained Palestinian interrogators tortured and 
questioned him for weeks, before offering him a college scholarship in exchange for information about his 
classmates, a deal he refused.     
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This is the state that Salem Fayyad and his western backers are in the process of constructing – an 
old-fashioned Arab autocracy with a neoliberal security state twist.  Helga Baumgarten, a professor of Political 
Science at Birzeit University, has characterized the current political moment in the Occupied Territories as 
being a contest between Hamas’s brand of political Islam on one hand, and an uneasy marriage between the 
neo-patrimonial corruption and clientelism of Mahmoud Abbas’s ruling Fateh party and the technocratic, 
donor-supported state building practices of Salem Fayyad.15  The new Muqata’ is being built at the crux of 
these competing forces.  Western donors have paid private local contractors, likely selected through a system 
of familio-politial patronage, to carry out a massive construction project deemed essential to the state building 
process, in order to detain prisoners from political factions opposed to this status quo (namely Hamas), and 
to garrison the security forces whose role is to capture and defeat these dissidents.   
With plans to unilaterally declare an independent Palestinian state (again) by 2011, a massive state-
building process is underway – and while few new political institutions are being built, plenty of buildings 
are.16  An essential part of this state building process is the construction of prisons to lock people up and 
roads to move goods around, a typical neoliberal spatial arrangement being funded entirely through Western 
rents.  The US Government Accountability Office report evaluating US security assistance to the PA notes 
this correlation between beefed-up Palestinian security and increased West Bank mobility stating that, the 
need for “key manned Israeli security checkpoints in the West Bank” has declined due to increased policing 
efforts on the part of the Palestinians.17  Salem Fayed has even floated the possibility of letting Palestinian 
soldiers take over some of the checkpoints.  While neoliberal capitalism may be the professed ideology, a 
swollen state sector kept afloat by Western donors, including US security assistance, is the reality.  Indeed, the 
current economic and building boom that Nablus is experiencing is only partially being driven by the 
loosening of travel restrictions allowing more shoppers to come to the market; it is largely being fueled by a 
huge influx of reconstruction money as the US prepares for a final peace push.  One of the biggest recipients 
of this influx of cash, and one of the biggest segments of the bloated bureaucracy, is the Palestinian security 
sector.  Although estimates vary, the Palestinian Authority employs some 60,000 police and soldiers, with 
another 30,000 civilian employees working in the security sector on the American pay-roll as well.18  New 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
15
 BauŵgaƌteŶ, Helga.  ͞OĐĐupied PalestiŶe ďetǁeeŶ Neo-Patrimonialism (Fateh), Technocratic State-Building 
;“alaŵ FaǇǇadͿ, the Rule of PolitiĐal Islaŵ ;HaŵasͿ, aŶd ReŶts fƌoŵ the West aŶd the East͟, foƌ The Transformation 
of Palestine: Palestine and the Palestinians 60 Years after the ͚Nakba͛, Berlin, 8 March 2010. 
16
 BƌoǁŶ, NathaŶ.  ͞Aƌe the PalestiŶiaŶs BuildiŶg a “tate?͟, Carnegie Commentary, June 2010. 
17
 Government AĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ OffiĐe, ͞PalestiŶiaŶ AuthoƌitǇ: U.“. AssistaŶĐe Is TƌaiŶiŶg aŶd EƋuippiŶg “eĐuƌitǇ  
Forces, but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces Logistical ConstraiŶts͟, MaǇ ϮϬϭϬ, p. 26. 
18 These numbers are based on the GAO report cited above,  as well as numbers from an older 2006 report called 
͞The PalestiŶiaŶ “eĐuƌitǇ “eƌǀiĐes: Past aŶd PƌeseŶt͟ ďǇ Husaŵ MadhouŶ foƌ the PalestiŶiaŶ NGO MIFTAH.  These 
numbers also represent estimates I have heard from Palestinian sources, although exact figures are hard to come 
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recruits train in large training camps in Jordan under American tutelage and alongside Iraqi army recruits, 
likewise being trained as a colonial police force guarding against internal dissidents, not foreign occupiers.  
Of the $500 million dollars pledged to the Palestinian Authority by the US State Department for 
fiscal year 2010, a total of $400 million dollars is to be spent through USAID on infrastructural projects 
(much of which being carried out in Area C under Israeli administration, thus helping Israel to ease its burden 
as occupier), debt servicing, and various other “humanitarian and democracy promotion” projects.19  The 
remaining $100 million dollars is to be spent through the Department of State’s International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement account for the purposes of “security reform”.20  The Palestinian Authority is the fifth 
largest recipient of INCLE funds, coming in behind Afghanistan ($420 mil), Colombia ($249 mil), Mexico 
($190 mil), and Pakistan ($130 mil), and just above Iraq ($52 mil).21  This assistance largely pays for the 
purchase of non-lethal weapons procurement, infrastructure projects such as the building of new barracks 
and police stations (Fayyed has called for the construction of twice as many police stations as presently exist), 
as well as training for the Palestinian National Security Forces and Presidential Guard22 in “gendarmerie 
tasks” such as handling “temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds”.23   
The Palestinian National Security Forces had the chance to test their new crowd control training 
during the Israeli Operation Cast Lead.  As Amira Hass reported in the Israeli daily Haaretz, “Ramallah 
residents were shocked…when a protest against the Israeli offensive in Gaza was forcibly dispersed by 
Palestinian Authority security forces using tear gas and clubs”.24  Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, the US 
Security Coordinator between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, characterized this moment, with a third 
intifada looming in the West Bank, as the greatest challenge the new Palestinian Security Forces had 
encountered.  As Dayton observes, the challenge was met outstandingly: 
 the new professionalism and competency of the new Palestinian security forces guaranteed a 
measured and disciplined approach to the popular unrest. Their guidance from the prime 
minister and president was clear: allow demonstrations, but do not allow them to become 
violent, and keep the demonstrators away from the Israelis.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
by, especially as the security forces informally hire hundreds if not thousands of informants who get paid to report 
on the conversations they here in mosques and cafes.   
19
 “ee Lisa BhuŶgalia’s foƌthĐoŵiŶg ǁoƌk oŶ this topiĐ.   
20
 )aŶotti, Jiŵ.  ͞U.“. “eĐuƌitǇ AssistaŶĐe to the PalestiŶiaŶ AuthoƌitǇ͟, Congressional Research Service, 8 January 
2010, p. 14. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 In addition to this direct support and training, the US Central Intelligence Agency has also been providing 
support to the Palestinian General Intelligence Agency and the Orwellian-sounding Preventative Security 
Organization, both of which, along with the Presidential Guard, report directly to President Mahmoud Abbas, 
ǁhose teƌŵ eǆpiƌed iŶ JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬϬϵ.   “ee IaŶ CoďaiŶ, ͞CIA WoƌkiŶg CloselǇ ǁith PalestiŶiaŶ “eĐuƌitǇ AgeŶts͟ iŶ 
The Guardian, 17 December 2009.  
23
 GAO, ͞PalestiŶiaŶ AuthoƌitǇ͟, p. ϭϯ. 
24
 Hass, Amira.  ͞Palestinian security forces break up Gaza protest,͟ Haaretz, 11 January 2009. 
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This time, unlike any time in the past, the Palestinian president and prime minister had tools 
adequate to the task. The IDF also felt—after the first week or so—that the Palestinians 
were there and they could trust them. As a matter of fact, a good portion of the Israeli army 
went off to Gaza from the West Bank—think about that for a minute—and the commander 
was absent for eight straight days. That shows the kind of trust they were putting in these 
people now. 
In short, the PA security forces provided direct assistance to the Israeli attack on Gaza, allowing Israeli 
commanders to divert forces away from the West Bank to be used in the offensive on Gaza.     
Like the jails that everyone sees but ignores, there is an unspoken, or at least quietly murmured, 
acknowledgement that the Palestinian security is not there to provide security to the Palestinians, but from 
them.  Riding in a taxi recently with a colleague of mine, a proudly apolitical Palestinian woman from a 
somewhat privileged family, remarked as we passed through one of the intersections guarded by the 
Authority, “it’s like, when I see them, I don’t even consider them Palestinians, it’s just another occupation.”  I 
have heard this observation so many times it has become a cliché.  In another shared taxi ride I found myself 
next to a Palestinian man who was on his first return trip to Nablus since the second intifada.  Upon passing 
PA soldiers at the same intersection he asked the driver “are those Arabs or Jews?”  To which the driver 
snorted, “what’s the difference?”  Even members of the security forces themselves recognize their role.  A 
colleague of mine was recently arrested, along with over 800 other men following the Hamas shooting in 
Hebron in last fall.  He was held for almost two months, missing the post-Ramadan Eid feast, and being held 
just long enough to not be able to finish the academic semester, as was the intention of his captors (he has 
been in and out of Israeli and Palestinian 9 times, and has lost about 4 semesters during those periods).  
During his time there, one of his temporary cellmates was a Palestinian Authority soldier, who had been 
accused of raping a boy.  After some time he confessed to his cellmates, “we’re all criminals.  You think we’re 
a national army?  We’re trained by the Americans, we’re basically another Israeli division.” 
In popular discourse, there are two countervailing sentiments I hear repeatedly in Nablus.  One, 
states: ma fi qanoon, there is no law, in the sense of there being no rights, no justice, and no system to address 
social ills or redress abuse and corruption.  There other statement I hear is the exact opposite, fi qanoon, there 
is law.  Law and order have finally been restored in Nablus, and people can walk about freely and drive in the 
streets without fear of clashes or violence.  In a way, both statements are true.  There is law, in that there is 
law enforcement, police officers and soldiers who give a feeling of governmental control and stability after 
many years of fawda, chaos.  But there isn’t a stably functioning Palestinian legislature actually passing laws, 
nor is there an independent judiciary enforcing the laws, or a functioning civil court system.  Rather there is a 
system of familial and political patronage, and an authoritarian system of maintaining order, rounding up 
anyone whose loyalty is uncertain.  What is still to be determined is whether this authoritarian law 
enforcement is just a necessary step that must be taken to provide the stability necessary to attract much 
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needed foreign investment and to finally build the legal and civil institutions vital to the creation of a 
Palestinian state, as its apologists in the State Department would claim.  Or whether this Palestinian state will 
ultimately obstruct the freedom that Palestinians yearn for.     
Post Script 
Recently I made a visit to a friend of mine in Balata refugee camp.  I visited him and his wife, an 
elementary school teacher, in their family home, which he recently completed after 10 long years of piecemeal 
construction.  He is a clever young man, especially good with languages.  He is also religiously devout, but 
moderately so, as his clean-shaven face belies, and he is equally devoted to his nation.  In short, he is the 
perfect candidate for the mukhabarat, the secret security forces, which he just recently joined.  He serves his 
duty, but he is not without his doubts.  While sitting on his roof in the early evening light he confessed that 
“the things I do every day, the things I’m ordered to do, would have gotten me executed as a collaborator in 
this camp just a few years ago, but now it’s policy.  During the day we do Israel’s dirty work, and at night we 
hide in our holes from them as they finish the job.  How can we call ourselves security when during the day 
we work for the people we need security from and at night we hide from them?”  Being on the American 
pay-roll does not necessarily a loyal follower make.  While the state-building process is securely in the hands 
of pro-Western clients now, it is entirely uncertain what will happen when this old guard is overtaken by a 
new generation of leaders.  Will they be emboldened by the shift in regional power dynamics, as Turkey, Syria 
and Iran assert themselves against the declining influence of Israel and US?  Or will they want to build malls 
and go shopping?  Having sacrificed so much, and lost so many years, one cannot blame Palestinians, 
especially the youth, for grasping this moment of normality and enjoying it as much as possible.  And yet, and 
many Palestinians, are left wondering, how long will this momentary illusion of normalcy last, and at what 
price is it being purchased? 
 
